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Mental Health Treatment Refusal
in Correctional Institutions:
A Sociological and Legal Analysis
RUDOLPH ALEXANDER, JR.

The University of Minnesota
School of Social Work

Recently, the courts have recognized the right to a minimum level of
mental health treatment for individuals confined in both mental and
correctionalinstitutions, utilizing a different rationale for each system.
As mental health administratorsin state mental hospitals accepted that
they were responsiblefor providing an increased level of mental health
services, they were disappointed that courts had subsequently ruled
that individuals in state hospitals had a right to refuse treatment. The
purpose of this paper is to elaborate, sociologically and legally, upon
treatment refusal in the correctionalsystem since most of the attention
on treatment refusal has focused on individuals in state mental hospitals
and since the legal status of inmates in correctionalsystems is different.
An anlysis of the literature revealed that inmates in correctionalinstitutions, similar to individuals in the state hospital system, have a limited constitutional right to refuse mental health treatment, and this
right is unlimited when the treatment provided is considered by the
courts to be in fact punishment.

Within the last twenty years there has been a steady development of case laws supporting the right to treatment for persons confined primarily in mental institutions (Johnson v.
Solomon, 1979; Rouse v. Cameron, 1966; Scott v. Plante, 1981;
State in the Interest of R.G.W., 1976; Welsch v. Likins, 1974), and

some professionals have argued that, under appropriate circumstances, there is a right to mental health treatment for inmates
confined in correctional institutions as well (Alexander, 1987b;
Brenner & Galanti, 1985). As a result of this newly established
right, institutions, both mental and correctional, had to
strengthen their treatment services to inmates. About the time
that significant changes were being made, there began the as-
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sertion, much to the chagrin of mental health professionals, that
institutional mental health recipients had the right to refuse
treatment. Psychologists and psychiatrists lamented that it is
impossible to have a right to treatment and at the same time
also have the right to refuse treatment (Hassenfeld & Grumet,
1984). Yet, advocates for inmates insist that some mental health
treatments (i.e., psychotropic drugs, psychosurgery, aversive
therapy) cause irreversible bodily damages (Herr, Arons, & Wallace, 1983) or in the case of correctional inmates are in fact punishment in disguise. When this is the case, there is a right to
refuse treatment. Given that there is a right to refuse treatment
for individuals in state mental hospitals (Beis, 1984; Bonnie,
1982; Brant, 1984; Brotman, 1982; Hoge, Gutheil, & Kaplan, 1987;
Norris, Carroll, & Watson, 1980; Plotin, 1978; R.M.R., 1981),
there practically should be the right to refuse treatment for inmates in correctional institutions. The purpose of this paper is
to explain the right to refuse mental health treatment for inmates
confined in correctional institutions. Admittedly, case laws arising from the mental health and correctional fields tend to be
separate and distinct bodies of law (Churgin, 1983). But the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that felons do not
automatically lose all of their rights, and the Constitution, albeit
hesitantly, follows them behind the walls of the penitentiary
(Pell v. Procunier, 1973). The elaboration of the right to refuse
mental health treatment, defined here as that treatment which
is designed to alter the behavior or mental functioning of a prisoner, will be done from both sociological and legal perspectives.
The Right to Mental Health Treatment
Before discussing the right to refuse treatment in a correctional institution, there needs to be an illumination of how the
right to treatment developed in the first place.
Recognition of the right to treatment was first announced in
1966 when Judge Bazelon ruled that a man institutionalized for
four years in a mental hospital had a statutory and constitutional
right to treatment (Rouse v. Cameron, 1966). Finding treatment
in Alabama state mental hospitals superficial, Judge Johnson
wrote that "to deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic
reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the
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very fundamentals of due process" (Johnson v. Solomon, 1979,
p. 279). One state court ruling in a case involving a juvenile that
had implications for the mental health system stated that "when
mental patients are committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably [emphasis added] have a constitutionally reinforced
right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of
them the realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or
her mental condition" (State in Interest of R.G.W., 1976, p. 1376).
In these cases the courts were simply saying that if a person's
liberty is taken away for the purposes of treatment, then that
person had a constitutional right to treatment. Subsumed in this
argument is the acknowledgement that a quid pro quo tacit
agreement arises between the state and the individual. That is
to say, the state takes something from the individual (his or her
freedom) and thus owes to that individual something of value
(treatment). When treatment is nonexistent, the person's constitutional right to due process has been violated.
In the matter of convicted offenders, the right to treatment
is medically based. Courts have held that the denial of medical
care to an inmate while imprisoned is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
(Estelle v. Gamble, 1976; Medcalf v. State of Kansas, 1970). Taking
this lead, other courts have ruled that the right to medical care
includes both physical and mental illnesses (Bowring v. Godwin,
1977; Rogers v. Evans, 1986; Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980). In a Texas case
in which the entire prison system was held to be unconstitutional, a federal judge restated the right to minimally adequate
mental health treatment in a prison setting and reaffirmed that
"a prison inmate is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or mental health care provider, exercising
ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes
with reasonable medical certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease
or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that
the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the
denial of care would be substantial" (Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980, p. 106).
Sociological Discussion of The Right to Refuse Treatment
One of the essential concerns of sociology is social control.
In its infancy, sociology understood social control as societal
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responses for managing members of society. Later, sociology
began to conceptualize social control more concisely as the control of deviant behaviors and the promotion of conformity (Conrad & Schneider, 1980). There is a consensus among most
members of society that without social control, society will
quickly disintegrate into chaos (Cockerham, 1981). Generally,
the institutions that helped to maintain social control primarily
were the family and the church. Scheff (1984), further, contended
that social control operates internally and externally to mold individuals' behaviors, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. Sanctions to nonconformists by social control agents for
nonconformity are applied inconsistently and are sometimes negotiable. Scheff also said that societal reaction to deviance is
usually in excess to what is actually needed. Sensitive to this
framework, studies of crime, delinquency, and mental illness
sought to explain deviancy but equally important sought to explain the societal reactions to deviancy. Consequently, dependent variables that measure the severity of societal response are
of central interest to investigators.
From a sociological perspective, mental illness is viewed as
a social status and not a disease. The evidence for this view
comes from studies which have shown how prevalent the symptoms of mental illness are in the general community and how
imprecise the defining symptoms are. Moreover, the status of
being mentally ill is ascribed by the societal reaction and not
really achieved by the person designated as mentally ill (Scheff,
1984; Shah, 1980). The issue of social control of the mentally ill
perturbs some professionals because of the imprecision of psychiatric diagnosis. Physicians specializing in internal medicine
can generally reach consensus on diagnosis of a heart attack,
appendicitis, or kidney failure, but mental health problems do
not present for psychiatrists a concrete set of symptoms for diagnosis that will lead to a consensus of what the problem is.
Oftentimes, it is the subjective opinion of the psychiatrists that
is the determining factor in labeling one as mentally ill (Cockerham, 1981). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), of
course, has helped to eliminate some of the subjectivity in psychiatric diagnosis, but vagueness of symptoms is still a problem.
For example, as a neophyte social work intern in a psychiatric
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unit of a major teaching hospital in Houston, Texas for indigent
citizens, the author observed a psychiatrist explaining to a medical student why a woman he had examined deserved a particular diagnosis. The psychiatrist, in accordance with the DSM IIn,
emphasized one criterion in the diagnosis as impulsiveness,
which was determined by family reports that the woman had
recently gone shopping and bought ten dresses. However, affluent people frequently buy clothing in bundance. This is an example of why sociologists, such as Lemert and Becker, believe
that the symptoms of mental illness are imprecise and vague.
Despite these imprecisions, Conrad and Schneider (1980)
averred that "medicine, especially psychiatry, has replaced religion as the most powerful extralegal institution of social control" (p. 241). Medical social control seeks to minimize, eliminate,
or normalize deviant behavior. If something is defined as a
psychic illness, it automatically becomes within the province of
psychiatry to cure regardless of the efficaciousness of its intervention. At the same time, Conrad and Schneider suggest that
there are positive benefits to the medicalization of deviance,
such as viewing alcoholism or mental illness humanitarianly.
However, they identified seven negative byproducts. These are:
(1) dislocation of responsibility; (2) assumption of the moral
neutrality of medicine; (3) domination of expert control;
(4) medical social control; (5) individualization of social problems; (6) depoliticization of deviant behavior; and (7) exclusion
of evil (Conrad & Schneider, 1980).
Turning to the correctional institution, Waldron stated that
modern correctional organizations' two essential functions are
treatment and custody or control. The custody or control function of a correctional institution refers to establishing secure
housing, safety for the staff and inmates, and a controlled environment. To be sure, some treatment activities, such as classification, also serve a custody and control function. Imperative
to the control function is the establishment of rules for inmates
to follow. Waldron, in addition, wrote that "although most of
these rules are legitimate requirements for maintaining control,
in some prisons and jail situations they are also used as a means
of repression and punishment in the mistaken belief that control
demands complete regimentation in all areas of prison life"
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(Waldron, 1984, p. 371). On the other hand, Nassi argued that
despite the manifest goal by some states that imprisonment is
in part for rehabilitation or treatment, the overriding goal is
always the punishment of the offender. As a consequence, prison
psychologists and psychiatrists compromise precepts derived
from their professional training in order "to be consonant with
the punitive function of the prison." Moreover, Nassi indicated
that "to the extent that psychiatrists and psychologists adhere
to the precepts of their profession, they will have to adjust these
precepts to function in harmony with the physical and social
environment of the prison. Alternatively, they may attempt to
reconstitute the organization and redirect its goals so that they
are more consonant with their belief system. However, to the
extent that the individual adjusts to the prison regime and alters
the professional orientation, this orientation may become so distorted that it does not even resemble the traditions of his discipline. It is in this way that treatment becomes indistinguishable
from punishments, except by name" (Nassi, 1980 p. 327).
As a matter of fact, most inmates are diagnosed as having
a character or personality disorder. Mental health professionals
believe that these inmates have accepted values that are contrary
to the dominant society. Generally, the inmates are hostile and
suspicious and feel that there is nothing wrong with their behavior (Silber, 1980). By way of illustration, inmates from one
Georgia prison, who probably were thought by psychologists to
have personality disorders, refused at one time to participate in
their treatment because the feeling was that the mental health
unit was an instrument of the prison administration to wage
psychological warfare against them. For some mental health officials this view may be evidence of paranoia, but the possibility
exists also that this view may be accurate and represents one of
the tools of institutional social control. Alternatively, it could be
an illustration of conflict between institutional and inmates' goals.
Halleck wrote insightfully about this conflict when he said:
The conflict between the interest of society and the interest of the
individual offender can be illustrated most powerfully by considering the "political prisoner". Some men violate the law out of
conscience or as part of a deliberate effort to change the society.
If we "rehabilitated" these men and trained them to behave in a
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manner which the mass of citizens might find desirable, we would
be negating their freedom to dissent and depriving the society of
one important channel for social change. Consider, for example,
the impact on our society if our prisons had succeeded in rehabilitating such convicted offenders as Henry Thoreau, Eugene Debs,
Martin Luther King, or Malcolm X. [To this list could be added the
Honorable Elijah Muhammed who went to prison for refusing to
serve in the armed services and later built the Nation of Islam and
the Berrigan Brothers who were jailed for activities protesting the
Vietnam War.] These examples dramatize that the issue of rehabilitation must be considered not only in terms of our capacity to
change human behavior but also in terms of under what circumstances and to what extent we should be allowed to do so (Halleck,
1980, p. 337).
This represents an example of one of Conrad and Schneider's
concerns that medical social control could facilitate the depoliticization of deviant behavior. Offenders, as a practical matter,
are sent to prison as punishment for violating criminal statutes.
Hence, the loss of liberty for a specific period is the prescribed
punishment, and one could assert that any attempt to take away
what one believes is beyond the statutory requirement (Vetter
& Rieber, 1980) and an issue for litigation.
Legality of The Right To Refuse Treatment
Sharipo (1974) theorized that the first Amendment to the
United States Constitution "protects a person's power to generate
thoughts, ideas, and mental activity." He called this protection
a person's freedom of mentation and based it on the following
analysis: (1) The First Amendment protects communication of
virtually all kinds, whether in writing, verbal, pictorial or any
symbolic form, and whether cognitive or emotive in nature;
(2) Communication entails the transmission and reception of
whatever is communicated; (3) Transmission and reception necessarily involve mentation on the part of both the person transmitting and the person receiving; (4) It is in fact impossible to
distinguish in advance mentation which will be involved in or
necessary to transmission and reception from mentation which
will not; (5) If communication is to be protected, all mentation
regardless of its potential involvement in transmission or rejec-
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tion must therefore be protected. Having established the basis
for the protection of mentation, Shapiro posited that as a corollary the next two propositions form a right to be free from
coercive organic therapies: (6) Organic therapy intrusively alters
or interferes with mentation; and (7) The First Amendment
therefore protects persons against enforced alteration or interference with their mentation by coerced organic therapy. It appears that there has been some recognition of First Amendment
violation when drugs are administered against an individual's
will (Shavill, 1981; Torrey, 1983), and some court decisions have
recognized a limited right to refuse treatment in the absence of
an emergency (Brooks, 1980; Brotman, 1982).
Seeing it a little differently, Beyer theorized that individuals
have two types of freedom-freedom to and freedom from. He
believes, for example, that "freedom to tattoo one's body involves a freedom from state constraints upon tattooing; freedom
from compulsory state tattoos involves a freedom to keep one's
body untatooed. Yet there remains an important conceptual distinction between freedom to tattoo oneself if one wants and
freedom from the state compelling one to be tattooed if one does
not. Freedom to (tattoo oneself, have an abortion, smoke marijuana) may conveniently be called autonomy, freedom from
(compulsory tattoos, police searches of the rectum, unwanted
blood transfusions) may conveniently be called integrity. When
one wants to tattoo oneself and the state will not let one, autonomy is abridged by a state constraint; when the state tattoos one
against one's will, integrity is invaded by a state compulsion"
(Beyer, 1980, p. 502).
Others have recognized the right to refuse treatment based
on the longstanding practice of informed consent as a prerequisite to treatment. At common law, any medical procedure that
is not consented to by a person is a battery. Broadening the
concept of consent, the court established the principle of informed consent. Informed consent not only requires that a person consent to a medical procedure but the person must be given
information on the possible risks and likely benefits. Additionally, the person must be told of alternative procedures, if any.
The reason for these explanations to a person is to respect his
or her right to autonomy or self-determination (Rodenhauser,
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1984). Granted, a doctor possesses more knowledge than a lay
person but the final treatment decision must lie with the individual (Annas, Glantz, & Katz, 1977; Rhoden, 1980; R.M.R.,
1981). Everyone has a fundamental right to determine to be
helped or left alone-the right to privacy (Middleton, 1980).
Even if the person's death is impending, an individual still has
the right to refuse treatment (Schwitzgebel, 1979).
Although most mental health professionals now concede that
there is a right to refuse treatment in a state mental hospital,
they know as a result of Rennie v. Klein and Rogers v. Orkin that
this right is limited as it can be overridden with procedural
safeguards in place. That means that the refusing patient must
have an independent review, assessment of the risks and benefits, perhaps involvement of an advocacy group, and an appeal
process (Parry, 1984).
The rationale for the right to refuse treatment is different
depending if a person is institutionalized based on parens patriae (intervening for the protection of the individual) or police
power (intervening for the protection of society). The state's authority to intervene under parens patriae assumes that the person is incompetent to give informed consent or refused treatment.
In the absence of competency, the state can force treatment if it
is believed to be in the best interest of the individual and if less
restrictive therapies are unsuitable. On the other hand, persons
institutionalized because of police powers are not assumed to
be incompetent and their mere confinement neutralizes their
threat to the community (Wexler, 1976). Therefore, a person who
is competent to make treatment decisions who is institutionalized under police powers has a stronger basis for refusing treatment than one has who has been institutionalized under parens
patriae and is deemed incompetent. Unlike mental hospitals
which have both individuals committed under parens patriae
and police powers, all correctional inmates are institutionalized
under police powers because they have been convicted of crimes
against society.
The Right To Refuse in a Correctional Setting
Most of the above discussions referred to individuals institutionalized in mental hospitals. However, there are implications
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for inmates incarcerated in correctional institutions. In 1973 the
United States Supreme Court affirmed that prisoners retain all
rights enjoyed by free citizens except those necessarily lost as
an incident of confinement (Pell v. Procunier,1973). What is considered an incident of confinement is the recognition by the legal
system of valid penal objectives of deterrence (specific and general), rehabilitation, and institutional security (Pugh v. Locke,
1971). As a result, rights which do not interfere or clash with
these objectives are kept by inmates. As a specific example, a
federal appeals court ruled the dual commitment procedure in
New York state as illegal because a person convicted under a
criminal statute was entitled to the same rights that a civilian
enjoys (Schuster v. Harold, 1969).
Initially, the right to refuse treatment emerged from the
criminal justice system. Lawsuits initiated by individuals judged
incompetent to stand trial, judged insane, and convicted under
the general penal statutes reached the courts alleging that they
were subjected to abusive "treatment" (Shobat, 1985). For example, an inmate of a New York prison system who accused the
administration of being corrupt in 1941 was diagnosed as paranoid and transferred to the Dannemora State Hospital For The
Criminally Insane for an unspecified period although he was
close to serving his original sentence. In 1969, a federal court
ruled in his favor and said in effect that his treatment had to
end (Talbott & Kaplan, 1983).
Further, it is not uncommon for prison officials to use drugs
as a means of social control. Mattocks and Jew researched aversive therapy on California prisoners in 1967 and wrote glowingly
of its efficacy. They suggested that innumerable assaults, stabbings, self-mutilations, and suicidal attempts probably were reduced by the use of Anectine, a drug used in aversive treatment,
and that 57 percent of the treated prisoners were able to get
further treatment in a psychiatric unit or suitable for transfer to
other prisons for "programming" (Mattocks & Jew, 1982). The
court began to look at aversive therapy and found programs in
California and Iowa in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (Knecht v. Gillman, 1973; Mackey v. Procunier, 1973; Shapiro, 1974). Labeling
a practice treatment does not bar scrutiny to determine if it is
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in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. It is the intent, the actual procedure,
and the results that are important, not whether the state calls a
practice treatment instead of punishment (Schwitzgebel, 1979).
The court noted in the Iowa case that "whether it [the treatment]
is called aversive stimuli or punishment, the act of forcing someone to vomit for a fifteen minute period for committing some
minor breach of the rules can only be regarded as cruel and
unusual unless the treatment is being administered to a patient
who knowingly and intelligently has consented to it" (Knecht
v. Gillman, 1973, p. 1140). Implied in this decision is the right
to refuse treatment.
Correctional treatment which is designed to change the mind
of thought processes of inmates can be rightfully refused as
being violative of their right to free speech. Recent case laws
have established the right to "mind freedom" and "privacy of
the mind." There is a fundamental right of people to be secure
in their private thoughts. Ordinarily, courts are reluctant to interfere with this right unless the state advances a compelling
interest (Vetter & Rieber, 1980). Thus, the right of an individual
to have, for instance, delusional thoughts is protected from alteration by the state. To comprehend this principle it is important to understand that many delusional thoughts are not harmful
to the state or the individual. An inmate who believes he is
Jesus or has thoughts, realistic or unrealistic, of grandeur is not
threatening to institutional order, and it would be difficult for
the state to persuasively argue that a compelling state interest
exists in seeking to alter such thoughts.
In Rummels v. Rosendale the issue was a purely medical issue
but had implication for mental health. In this case, Rummels
was operated on for a hemorrhoidectomy against his will. The
court ruled that "allegations that prison medical personnel performed major surgical procedures upon the body of an inmate,
without his consent and over his known objection, that were
not required to preserve his life or further a compelling interest
of imprisonment or prison security, may foreshadow proof of
conduct violative of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
sufficient to justify judgment under the Civil Rights Act" (Rummels v. Rosendale, 1974, p. 735). In a later case a man named
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Scott was held incompetent to stand trial in 1954 and also was
held to be mentally incompetent. Scott began habeas corpus
action claiming that he was forced to take drugs and treatment
against his will. The court suggested that in the absence of an
emergency unconsented treatment of a drug that affects the mind
is a tort and actionable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Scott v.
Plante, 1976).
Besides psychotropic drugs, the state possesses a wide array
of medical tools, such as electrical stimulations of the brain by
implantation of electrodes, psychosurgery, and organic conditioning techniques, with which to control the behavior of inmates in both correctional and mental institutions. Use of
psychotropic drugs can alleviate the symptoms of mental illness,
but the misuse of them, as well as the other interventions, foreshadows an abridgement of personal freedom for inmates (Shapiro, 1973).
The United States Supreme Court examined the transfer of
a Nebraska prisoner to a mental hospital and ruled that Vitek
had a right to a hearing because of the substantial change in
condition of a transfer to a mental hospital. The court wrote
"While a conviction and sentence extinguish an individual right
to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, they do
not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and to subject
him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him
additional due process protections. Here, the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treatment coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to
mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental illness,
constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections .... Although the state's interest in segregating
and treating mentally ill patients is strong, the prisoner's interest
in not being arbitrarily classified as mentally ill and subjected to
unwelcomed treatment [emphasis added] is also powerful, and the
risk of error in making the determinations . . .is substantial enough
to warrant appropriate procedural safeguards against error" (Vitek v. Jones, 1979, p. 481).
While the court did not specifically say that Vitek had an absolute right to refuse treatment, there are fairly strong references
that a prisoner could not be capriciously treated against his will.
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For example, some of the procedural requirements for a Vitek
hearing are the opportunity for the inmate to present witnesses
in his or her behalf, to crossexamine state witnesses, and to
have an independent decision maker. These safeguards suggest
that an inmate has the right to refuse treatment that is not in
his or her best interest. Having the right to challenge state witnesses and the right to an independent decision maker will stop
unnecessary treatment decisions. Hence, there is a latent pronouncement of a right to refuse or reject treatment that is unwarranted in this decision.
Similarly, another federal court ruled that the Federal Bureau
of Prison's START (Special Treatment and Rehabilitation Training) program was reviewable as possibly being violative of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment despite the assertion of the prison officials that the program was treatment. START consisted of placing problem inmates
on a level system with just the bare essentials and allowing them
to move up depending upon improved behavior. However, some
critics charged that the initial level of deprivation was too low
and unconstitutional. The issue became moot when the program
was terminated and the court did not make a ruling (Clone v.
Richardson, 1974). Like aversive therapy, the START program
could be reasonably construed as being punishment and subject
to the test of whether it was cruel and unusual punishment.
Similar to their counterparts in state mental hospitals, prisoners have a limited right to refuse treatment which can be
overridden. For instance, at the Federal Medical Center at Rochester, prisoners who are transferred there for psychiatric treatment are sent back to their sending institutions if they refuse
treatment. However, if it is determined that the prisoner is dangerous to himself or others, he can be forcibly treated following
an adverse ruling from a hearing at the institution before a federal magistrate. In like manner, the Oak Park Heights Correctional Institution has a mental health unit that is responsible for
treating all of the mentally ill male offenders in the Minnesota
system. By statute, it has the authority to forcibly treat a psychotic inmate following a hearing before a judge (Alexander,
1987a). Hence, one can see similar types of safeguard procedures
in the prison system that exist in the mental health system.
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Conclusion
The essential focus of this paper was the elaboration of the
right to refuse mental health treatment in correctional institutions. This is an essential right given that the dominant penal
philosophy is to punish offenders and given that medical technology may discover more effective behavior controlling drugs
or innovations. It is quite easy for institutional treatment officials to stray, as some examples in this paper have shown, from
their helping philosophy and adopt practices that are punishing.
Perhaps, this is an inevitability given the environment of a total
institution. It must be remembered that antipsychotic drugs,
which sound helpful, do not cure mental illness and have serious
side effects. The primary benefit of psychoactive drugs is to
temporarily make a person more manageable, and they do not
produce any permanent changes (Bartol & Bartol, 1986). Moreover, as major tranquilizers, they can be used as an effective
means of social control in an institution. Churgin (1983) cited
a study in his article which showed that inmates in one prison
system were transferred to mental hospitals for being disruptive
and not for being mentally ill. Occasionally, one hears snide
references about the Soviet Union who reportedly put some of
their dissidents in psychiatric hospitals as a means of stifling
dissent. But the same type of practice can be done to citizens in
the United States who are powerless and despised, like prison
inmates are, if the right to refuse treatment is unavailable.
Whenever something of a treatment nature is planned for an
inmate, the following question needs to be asked "is it really for
the inmate or is it for the institution"? While institutional social
control is not per se opprobrious, it can be if allowed to go
unchecked. The courts have offered some fairly sound guidelines
spelling out when psychiatric or psychological treatment is indicated (Ruiz v. Estelle, 1980), and all are focused on the inmates'
needs rather than institutional. Allowing inmates the limited
right to refuse questionable therapies and drugs is necessary in
order to protect against institutional abuses.
References
Alexander, R., Jr. (1987a). A report of mental health treatment programs in corrections with a comparison of the mental health units at Oak Park Heights and
the federal medical center correctional institutions. Unpublished paper.

Treatment Refusal
Alexander, R., Jr. (1987b). The right to mental health treatment in mental and
correctionalinstitutions. Unpublished paper.
Annas, G. J., Glantz, L. H., & Katz, B. (1977). Informed consent to human
experimentation. Cambridge: Ballinger.
Bartol, C. R., & Bartol, A. M. (1986). Criminal behavior: A psychosocial approach (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall.
Beis, E. B. (1984). Mental health and the law. Rockville: Aspen.
Beyer, S. (1980). Madness and medicine: The forcible administration of psychotropic drugs. Wisconsin Law Review, 5, 497-567.
Bonnie, R. J. (1982). The psychiatric patient's right to refuse medication: A
survey of the legal issues. In A. E. Doudera & J. Swazey (Eds.), Refusing
treatment in mental health institutions-values in conflict (pp. 19-30). Ann
Arbor: AUPHA Press.
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 E2d. 44 (4th. Cir. 1977).
Brant, J. (1984). Constitutional law-patients' rights-refusal of medication.
Massachusetts Law Review, 69, 98.
Brooks, A. D. (1980). Law, psychiatry and the mental health system. Boston:
Little and Brown.
Brotman, S. (1982). Behind the bench in Rennie v. Klein. In A. E. Doudera
& J. P. Swazey (Eds.), Refusing treatment in mental health institutions-values
in conflict (pp. 31-41). Ann Arbor: AUPHA.
Churgin, M. J. (1983). The transfer of inmates to mental health facilities:
Developments in the law. In J. Monahan & H. J. Steadman (Eds.), Mentally disordered offenders (pp. 207-232). New York: Plenum.
Clone v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
Cockerham, W. C. (1981). Sociology of mental disorder. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
Conrad, P., & Schneider, J. W. (1980). Deviance and medicalization: From badness to sickness. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976).
Halleck, S. L. (1980). Rehabilitation of criminal offenders-a reassessment
of the concept. In H. J. Vetter & R. W. Rieber (Eds.), The psychological
foundations of criminaljustice (Vol. II) (pp. 335-351). New York: The John
Jay Press.
Halleck, S. L. (1986). The mentally disorderedoffender. (DHHS Publication No.
ADM 86-1471). Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health.
Hassenfeld, I. N., & Grumet, B. (1984). A study of the right to refuse treatment. The Bulletin of American Psychiatry and The Law, 12, 65-74.
Herr, S. S., Arons, S., & Wallace, R. E. (1983). Legal rights and mental health
cre. Lexington: D. C. Heath.
Hoge, S. K., Gutheil, T. G., & Kaplan, E. (1987). The right to refuse treatment
under Rogers v. Commissioner: Preliminary empirical findings and
comparisons. the Bulletin of American Psychiatry and The Law, 15, 163169.
Johnson v. Solomon, 484 E supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979).
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d. 1136 (8th. Cir. 1973).
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).

Journalof Sociology & Social Welfare
Mattocks, A. L., & Jew, C. C. (1982). Aversive therapy. In N. Johnston &
L. D. Savitz (Eds.), Legal process and corrections (pp. 285-287). New York:
John Wiley & Sons.
Middleton, M. (Dec. 1980). Mentally disabled patients win right of refusal.
American Bar Association Journal, 66, 1512.
Nassi, A. J. (1980). Therapy of the absurd: A study of punishment and treatment in California prisons and the roles of psychiatrists and psychologists. In H. J. Vetter & R. W. Rieber (Eds.). The psychological foundations
of criminaljustice (Vol. II) (pp. 322-334). New York: The John Jay Press.
Norris, J. A., Carroll, K., Watson, B. L. (1980). Selected recent court decisions. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 6, 381-382.
Parry, J. (1984). Right to refuse psychotropic medication. Mental and Physical
Disability Law Reporter, 8, 82-85.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817 (1973).
Plotin, R. (1978). Limiting the therapeutic orgy: Mental patients' right to
refuse treatment. Northwestern University Law Review, 72, 461-525.
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
Rhoden, N. K. (1980). The right to refuse psychotropic drugs. Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 15, 363-413.
R.M.R. (1981). The forcible medication of involuntarily committed mental
patients with antipsychotic drugs-Rogers v. Okin. Georgia Law Review,
15, 739-762.
Rodenhauser, P. (1984). Treatment refusal in a forensic hospital: Ill-Use of the
lasting right. The Bulletin of American Psychiatry and The Law, 12, 59-63.
Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052 (11th. Cir. 1986).
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733 (9th cir. 1974).
Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tx. 1980).
Scheff, T. J. (1984). Being mentally ill: A sociological theory (2nd. ed.). New
York: Aldine.
Schuster v. Harold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969).
Schwitzgebel, R. K. (1979). Legal aspects of the enforced treatment of offenders.
(DHEW Publication No. ADM 79-831). Rockville: National Institute of
Mental Health.
Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Shah, S. A. (1980). Crime and mental illness: Some problems in defining and
labeling deviant behavior. In H. J. Vetter & R. W. Rieber (Eds.), The
Psychologicalfoundations of criminaljustice (Vol II) (pp. 16-33). New York:
The John Jay Press.
Shapiro, M. H. (1974). Legislating the control of behavior control: Autonomy
and the coercive use of organic therapies. Southern California Law Review,
47, 237-356.
Shavill, N. L. (1981). Patient's rights vs. paptients needs: The right of the
mentally ill to refuse treatment in Colorado. Denver Law Journal,58, 567608.
Shobat, S. (1985). Pathway through the psychotropic jungle: The right to

Treatment Refusal

99

refuse psychotropic drugs in Illinois. The John Marshall Law Review, 18,
407-443.
Silber, D. E. (1980). Controversy concerning the criminal justice system and
its implications for the role of mental health workers. In H. J. Vetter &
R. W. Rieber (Eds.), The psychologicalfoundations of criminaljustice (Vol. II)
(pp. 34-62). New York: The John Jay Press.
State in Interest of R.G.W., 366 A.2d 1375 (1976).
Torrey, E. E (1983). Surviving schizophrenia: A family manual. New York: Harper and Row.
Vetter, H. J., & Rieber, R. W. (Eds.). (1980). The psychological foundations of
criminaljustice (Vol. II). New York: The John Jay Press.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1979).
Waldron, R. J. (1984). The criminal justice system: An introduction (3rd ed.)
Boston: Houghton.
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Mn. 1974).
Wexler, D. B. (1979). Criminal commitments and dangerous mental patients: Legal
issues of confinement, treatment, and release. (DHEW Publication No. adm
76-331). Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health.

